Germany's energy demand and supply until 2020 : implications for Germany's foreign energy policy by Stellmann, Lars
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2003-06
Germany's energy demand and supply
until 2020 : implications for Germany's
foreign energy policy
Stellmann, Lars
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/901
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
GERMANY’S ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY UNTIL 











 Thesis Advisor:   Robert E. Looney 
 Thesis Co-Advisor: Maria Rasmussen 
 


















 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2003 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Germany’s Energy Demand and Supply until 2020: 
                                                 Implications for Germany’s Foreign Energy Policy 
6. AUTHOR: Lars STELLMANN 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview of Germany’s energy supply options until 2020, the political 
implications and the respective consequences for Germany’s foreign energy policy.  The oil and gas supply situation for 
Germany will become more complex in the upcoming decade.  Since oil imports from the UK and Syria are expected to cease 
after 2005, 18% of the current oil supply will have to be substituted within this decade.  Russia may not be available to provide 
the amount necessary.  The gas situation is somewhat less urgent, as a supply shift will have to take place only after 2010, 
when the Norwegian and Dutch gas reserves cease to satisfy the export demand.  The only regions that will be able to provide 
oil and gas on a global level to meet the growing world demand will be the Middle East, Russia and other Caspian Sea 
neighbors.  Germany’s welfare is directly dependent on its economical success.  As a highly industrialized country, Germany 
should take a tremendous interest not only in the future development of the international energy market, but also in attempting 






15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
73 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Germany, Fossil Fuels, Energy Reserves, Energy Supply and Demand 
Forecasts, Energy Consumption 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited 
 
GERMANY’S ENERGY SUPPL AND DEMAND UNTIL 2020: 
IMPLICATIONS ON GERMANY’S FOREIGN ENERGY POLICY 
 
Lars Stellmann 
Lieutenant Commander, German Navy  
B.A., German Armed Forces Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Lars Stellmann 
 
 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iv
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview of Germany’s energy supply 
options until 2020, the political implications and the respective consequences for 
Germany’s foreign energy policy.  The oil and gas supply situation for Germany will 
become more complex in the upcoming decade.  Since oil imports from the UK and Syria 
are expected to cease after 2005, 18% of the current oil supply will have to be substituted 
within this decade.  Russia may not be available to provide the amount necessary.  The 
gas situation is somewhat less urgent, as a supply shift will have to take place only after 
2010, when the Norwegian and Dutch gas reserves cease to satisfy the export demand.  
The only regions that will be able to provide oil and gas on a global level to meet the 
growing world demand will be the Middle East, Russia and other Caspian Sea neighbors.  
Germany’s welfare is directly dependent on its economical success.  As a highly 
industrialized country, Germany should take a tremendous interest not only in the future 
development of the international energy market, but also in attempting to influence the 
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The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview of Germany’s energy supply 
options until 2020, the political implications and the consequences for Germany’s foreign 
energy policy.   
 
Germany is one of the world’s largest and strongest economies.  However, it lacks 
significant domestic energy sources and is heavily reliant on imports.  Roughly two-
thirds of Germany’s total energy consumption in 2001 was based on imported energy 
sources.  The US governmental Energy Information Agency (EIA) has classified these 
different types of energy sources, which provided for the total energy consumption, as 
follows:  Oil (41%), Natural Gas (23%), Coal (23%) and Nuclear Power (11%).  94% of 
the consumed oil and more than 75% of the gas are imported.  Even in the case of coal, 
which Germany produces in large quantities, the country is a net importer.  The vast 
majority of energy consumption forecasts for Germany until 2030 are expecting a light 
increase of around 1% per year.  However, the German government has decided to phase 
out nuclear energy production, which will be achieved approximately by 2021 - 2023.  In 
addition, rising gas consumption and the ecological and economical constraints on coal, 
e.g. the Kyoto Protocol, will inevitably lead to a further increase in Germany’s import 
dependence.  Parallel to this development is the overall world consumption forecasted 
with nearly 60% increase by 2025, which implies a sharp increase of the competition on 
the demand side, as some of the currently existing regional oil and gas reserves become 
already depleted soon after the turn of this decade.  As Germany has currently no 
distinctive energy strategy and the European Union (EU) only recently started to discuss 
a common strategy, it is decisive to point out the implied constraints on the regional 
energy supply options.   
This thesis views only the non-domestic energy development without examining 
domestic political mechanisms in depth.  Additionally, the focus lies on oil and gas as 
this will be the future energy sources after nuclear energy is phased out; and coal is 
constrained by environmental and competitive disadvantages.  Renewable energy sources 
are expected to account only for less than 10% in 2010 and little more than 10% in 2020 
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of the then total energy consumption.  The perspective of this thesis will be limited until 
2030 as nearly all precise forecasts and predictions are either until 2020 or 2030.  Hence, 
any need and definition of an energy strategy will be limited to this timeframe.   
This thesis explains why the supplier composition will change soon after 2010, 
when the reserves of Germany’s current suppliers become increasingly depleted.  
Therefore, the country has to re-orientate on the global energy market to find adequate 
substitution.   
Consecutively, the development on the supply side of the world market until the 
middle of the upcoming decade is examined.   
In the concluding chapter, the thesis draws out some implications for German 
energy policy. The chapter argues that Germany’s welfare is directly dependent on its 
economical success.  As a highly industrialized country, Germany should take a 
tremendous interest not only in the future development of the international energy 
market, but also in attempting to influence the development immediately following that 
of its domestic needs. 
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II. GERMANY’S ENERGY DEMAND 
 
A. PRESENT ENERGY SITUATION 
 
This chapter lays out the basis for a general understanding of Germany’s energy 
needs, starting with the description of current consumption and origins of the imports.  
The subsequent section provides an explanation of the political constraints on the German 
energy sector, particularly the firm commitment to phase out nuclear energy production.  
The final section of this chapter deals with the future energy demand in Germany. 
The data provided in this chapter are extracted from official German government 
publications, the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE).  Most of the newest 
accumulated data are from 2001; the 2002 data are extracted from press releases 
published by the Federal Office of Economics and Export (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und 
Ausfuhrkontrolle,or BAFA), which have been very accurate for the last few years.  The 
forecasts and predictions by the DoE/EIA, however, are from May 2003. 
 
1. Domestic Consumption 
 
Germany is the one of the world’s largest energy consumers, for per capita, as 
well as for total consumption.  In 2001, Germany consumed 172 gigajoule (GJ).  Only the 
Netherlands, France and USA had a higher appetite for energy.1  (See Figure 2.1).  
Germany’s economy is persistently the world third-largest economy after the United 
States (US) and Japan.  In 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) was $2,274 billion, 
only the US with $9,394 billion and Japan $4,376 billion had a stronger economy.2   
                                                 
1 Bundesministerium f. Wirtschaft u. Technologie (BMWI), ENERGIE DATEN 2002: Nationale und 
Internationale Entwicklung (Berlin/Köln: BMWI, 2002), 39. 

























This high economy based per capita consumption rate makes Germany, in 
combination with a population of over 82 million, the world’s fourth-largest energy 
consumer after Japan, China and the USA.  Figure 2.2 illustrates the total consumption in 
2001, providing a comparison to the regions and countries noted in figure 2.1.3   
 






















                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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 The consumption (approximately 85%) is primarily covered by fossil-fuel energy 
carriers (Figure 2.3).4   
 














However, with the exception of coal, Germany’s own energy resources are rather 
insignificant.  Germany is the third-largest oil consumer in the world, Europe’s largest 
coal consumer and the second-largest natural gas consumer.  The country constitutes by 
far the  largest energy market in Europe.   
While Germany consumed 2.7 million barrels/day (bbl/d) of oil in 2002, only 
69,000 bbl/d of crude oil were produced domestically. As result, over 97% of the 
required oil had to be imported.5  The production-consumption-ratio on the natural gas 
market is partly more positive.  In 2001, Germany produced 0.78 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) 
of natural gas and consumed 3.3 Tcf, indicating that over 76% of the consumed natural 
gas was imported.6  Although Germany, by far, is Europe’s largest producer of hard and 
lignite coal it has had to import hard coal since 1990.  In 2001, coal was responsible for 
24.3% of Germany’s primary energy consumption, hard coal 13.1% and lignite coal 
11.2%.  However, in that domestic hard coal is not competitive on the international 
market, because of the geological conditions and high labour costs, 54% of the consumed 
                                                 
4 BMWI, 10. 
5 DoE/EIA, Germany Country Analysis Brief (March 2003), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/germany.pdf  (09 June 2003). 
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hard coal and 1% of lignite coal are imported.  This also makes Germany a net coal 
importer.7   
In summary, 60% of Germany’s energy consumption in the last few years had to be 
imported.  The origins of the energy imports are described in the next section. 
 
2. Imports and Origins 
 
This section begins with oil imports and its origins, because oil accounts for the 
largest share of Germany’s energy consumption and Germany largely relies on oil 
imports.  Second in the sequence is gas, followed by hard coal. 
As stated earlier, Germany is over 97% dependent on oil imports.  What is 
remarkable is the diversification of the origins (Figure 2.4).  The importance of Russia 
and Norway has steadily increased over the last twelve years primarily due to the 
significant decrease of oil imports from the Middle East and the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  In 2002, OPEC accounted for a mere 19.5% 
only.8  The Russian share, meanwhile, increased from little over 24% in 1991 to 31% in 
2002.  Moreover, the Norwegian portion rose from 7.5% to 21% in the same period.9  In 
the decade from 1991 to 2001, this increased the import of crude oil by 19.2%, while also 








                                                                                                                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy 
Resources 2002 (Berlin: FMEL, 2002), 5. 
8 BAFA, EnergieINFO R12-2002 (10 February 2003), 
http://www.bafa.de/1/de/service/statistik/statistik.htm  (09 June 2003). 
9 BMWI, 19. 
10 BMWI, 10, 19. 
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(After: BAFA, EnergieINFO R12-2002 (10 February 2003), 
http://www.bafa.de/1/de/service/statistik/statistik.htm  (09 June 2003); (BMWI), 
ENERGIE DATEN 2002: Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung 
(Berlin/Köln: BMWI, 2002), 10, 19.) 
 
The international gas providers are not diversified to the same extent as that of the 
oil sources.  Over 94.5% of Germany’s natural gas imports are provided by three 
countries.  Russia accounts for 45%, Norway for 27% and the Netherlands for 22% of the 
gas imports in 2000.11  In general, the reliance on natural gas for the energy supply 
increased from 15.5% in 1990 to 21.5% in 2001.12  Although all three states together had 
the same share of Germany’s gas imports at the beginning of the 1990s, there was a shift 
away from the Netherlands towards Norway, while Germany increased its reliance on 






                                                 
11 DoE/EIA, Germany Country Analysis Brief. 
12 BMWI, 10. 
13 Ibid., 23. 
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Coal is the only fuel that actually lost its former significance as an energy 
provider, although lignite coal is the only sufficient domestic energy resource.  Still in 
1990, hard and lignite coal accounted for 37% of the energy consumption.  In 2001, its 
share, combined and divided, had fallen to little more than 24%.14  This trend seems to 
have continued as the import of hard coal in 2002 decreased further, by nearly 12% 
compared to 2001.15   
On the other hand, unlike any other energy resource, the import of hard coal is 
globally diversified.  Germany’s main supply (87%) comes from seven nations across all 








                                                 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 BAFA. 
16 BMWI, 25. 
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But how is the energy consumption itself structured and for what reason is the 
energy used?  This question will be answered in the next section. 
 
3. Consumer  Structure 
 
Since 1990, the trend in energy consumption is moving away from the industrial 
sector towards the transportation sector and private households (see figure 2.4).17  
Several reasons are responsible for this change.  For the most part, there has been a shift 
from the heavy industry to an increasing, less energy intensive, service sector and the 
restructuring of the East German economy.  On the other hand, more and more goods are 
transported along land and road access.  The “just-in-time delivery” provides one 
explanation, but the superior flexibility of road transportation and the ever-increasing 
importance of Germany as a European transit corridor, particularly for the east-west 
transit, is another.  Moreover, there is also the increasing number of private households 
and private mobility, contributing to a constant growth in the number of vehicles.18  The 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 11-13. 
18 IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Germany 2002 Review (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002), 45. 
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number of private households, for example, increased approximately 10% during the 
period of 1990 to 2000.19   
 














The energy markets and use of energy are traditionally one of the most regulated 
and politically influenced sectors of the economy.  These influences on the German 
energy situation are highlighted in the following section.   
 
4. Policy Constraints 
 
The political influences and constraints on Germany’s energy situation can be 
viewed on three levels:  the national, European Union (EU) and international level.  This 
section explains the most important policy constraints and influences from the top-
international level down to the national level.   
The most influential international constraint is the Kyoto Protocol, which 
Germany ratified in April 2002.  By ratifying this agreement, Germany committed itself 
to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 8% by 2010 compared to 1990.  
However, within the EU-Burden-Sharing-Agreement addressing the Kyoto Protocol, 
                                                 
19 BMWI, 5. 
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Germany agreed to reduce its GHG emissions by a total of 21%.  Subsequently, Germany 
decided voluntarily to increase this figure to 25% already in 2005.20 
A second constraint, albeit more indirectly, is the WTO membership.  As the aim 
of the WTO is to create a non-discriminatory, most liberal (world) market, this has also 
stimulated an influence on the energy market, particularly with respect of lowering tariffs 
with the aim to create a liberal energy market.   
Increasingly, the EU is influencing the German energy market.  The common EU 
electricity-and-gas market is of direct importance.  The aim of the regulations is to 
gradually achieve an EU-wide liberalized market for electricity and gas.  The more the 
EU has legislative power over its member states, the greater the prospect is that Brussels 
will regulate the energy sector.  Furthermore, the fair-trading, anti-trust and subsidy laws 
/ agreements on EU level are successively overriding national regulations.21   
National policy, however, is currently still the most direct influential factor.  In 
order to achieve the ambitious goal of a 25% reduction of GHG emissions till 2005, the 
German government is heavily promoting (and subsidising) renewable energies on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, taxing the use of fossil fuels with the so-called eco-tax.  
Additionally, the government implemented energy efficiency programs, particularly for 
the private household sector, with an emphasis on conservation measures.22   
The most drastic political action, however, was the decision by the ruling Social 
Democratic-green coalition to abandon nuclear energy production.  This aim was the 
motivation and spirit of the Green Party, whose roots are nuclear disarmament movement 
at the early of the 1980s.   
The government started the negotiations on the regulations of the nuclear-phase-
out within the industry immediately following their election in 1998.  Finally, an 
agreement between the government and the industry was signed in June 2001 and the 
relevant law, the Atomic Energy Act (Atomgesetz),23 was changed in April 2002 by the 
parliament.  In accordance with the agreement, the total production of the nuclear power 
                                                 
20 Mineralölwirtschaftsverband (MWV), MineralölForum: Energiemarkt im Wandel (Hamburg: 
Druckerei Saphir Druck + Verlag, 2001), 32-33. 
21 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik für eine zukunftsfähige Energieversorgung: Energiebericht 
(Berlin: Möller Druck, 2001), 12. 
22 IEA, 38-39. 
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plants is limited to 2,623 terawatt-hour (TWh). However, it is transferable among the 
plants.  This results in an average lifetime of 32 years per nuclear power plant, so that the 
last plant will terminate its production, approximately over the period of 2020 to 2023.24  
Although the opposition parties, both Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP), 
intend to retain nuclear energy production, the public is divided.25  The public is deeply 
divided on the issue of nuclear energy expenditure / usage, which is also reflected in the 
on-going surveys conducted by the EU.26  It is not probable that a change in the 
government would lead to a substantially different policy, as the anti-atom movement 
could count on support of a respectable part of the society.   
The problem is, nevertheless, that nuclear power plants are providing 30% of the 
German electricity in 2001, which results in roughly 13% of the total primary energy 
supply in Germany.27  The German government expects nuclear energy to be substituted 
primarily by gas and renewables, but also by conservation measures and efficiency 
improvement.  In one scenario (see next section), even coal is perceived to serve as a 
viable substitute for nuclear energy.28   
It is obvious that the policies of GHG and CO2 emission reduction and the 
phasing out of nuclear energy production, on the other hand, are at least partly at 
loggerheads.  The future will indicate how the policy will react to this contradiction, 
whether with more or less political / tax policy dirigisme or, if it lets the market drive the 





                                                                                                                                                 
23 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 34. 
24 IEA, 111-113. 
25 see CDU, Maximen für eine zukunftsorientierte Energiepolitik im 21. Jahrhundert 20-21 (2001), 
http://www.cdu.de/politik-a-z/bundesfachausschuesse/energieprogramm.pdf  (09 June 2003); see FDP, 52. 
Ord. Bundesparteitag der F.D.P.: Energiepolitisches Programm (2001), http://www.fdp-
bundesverband.de/pdf/A-051.pdf  (09 June 203). 
26 European Opinion Research Group (EORG), EUROBAROMETER Energy, 56.2 and 58.0 (2002, 
each), http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/publications/eb_report.htm  (09 June 2003). 
27 BMWI, ENERGIE DATEN 2002, 10, 28. 
28 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 38-42. 
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5. Future Energy Demand 
 
Three different projections are taken to provide an outlook on the future German 
energy demand till 2020.  They are the governmental report “Sustainable Energy Policy 
to Meet the Needs of the Future” (Nachhaltige Energiepolitik für eine zukunftsfähige 
Energieversorgung), predictions by the IEA till 2010 in “Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries: Germany 2002 Review”, and reference case projections by the DoE/EIA also 
till 2020 in the “International Energy Outlook 2003”.  All these studies incorporate the 
phasing out of the German nuclear energy production.   
The basic assumptions, e.g. economic and population growth, of all three 
institutions are similar.  The German government expects an average annual economic 
growth of 1.9% till 2020,29 the IEA an average of 2.0 till 2010,30 and the EIA of 2.2% till 
2020 and 2025.31  The population is expected to decline from 82 million in 2000 till 2010 
to 78.6 million (IEA),32 81 million (EIA);33 till 2020 to 80.8 million (German 
government)34 and/or 80 million (EIA).35   
The differences, however, occur in the predictions for the total energy 









                                                 
29 Ibid., 39. 
30 IEA, 135. 
31 DoE/EIA, International Energy Outlook (Washington: National Energy Information Center, 2003), 
184. 
32 IEA, 135. 
33 DoE/EIA, 196. 
34 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 39. 
35 DoE/EIA, 196. 
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(After: DOE/EIA, 196; IEA, 133; BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 38-41.) 
 
The differences are based on varying assumptions as to how the energy efficiency 
can be improved.  While the German government expects a further improvement till 2020 
of 2.1% per year,36 the IEA is slightly less optimistic with an average improvement of 
1.65% per year till 2010.37  The EIA’s least optimistic prediction is only 1.3% per year 
till 2025.38  The results are different predictions regarding the electricity consumption 
and, therefore, production rate.  While the German government sees an increase only of 
8% by 2020,39 compared to 2000, the IEA expects already a growth until 2010 of 
5.45%.40  The EIA, moreover, predicts an increase of 28.7% from 2000 to 2020.41  







                                                 
36 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 41. 
37 IEA, 135. 
38 DoE/EIA, 5. 
39 BMWI, Nachhaltige Energiepolitik, 41. 
40 IEA, 135. 
41 DoE/EIA, 190. 
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In summary, one result is clear.  The energy import dependence will increase in 
the future.  Even in the most optimistic case, when the energy consumption decreases 
until 2020 by 3%, nuclear energy will be substituted by fossil fuels, upon which import 
Germany is already highly dependent.  The German government expects, in this case, an 
energy import dependence of 74% in 2020.42  Hence, the import dependence in the mid-
term can be expected to be at least three-fourth of the future primary energy 
consumption. 
The next chapter describes, in turn, the current supply side of the German energy 
consumption.   
                                                 



















This chapter examines the supply side of Germany’s energy market.  The 
emphasis lies on oil and gas, as coal is not of such future concern, because its sufficient 
supply is ensured.  The conclusion from this analysis is that the current supply structure 
will inevitably change within this decade.  To explain this result oil is the first fuel to be 
looked at, followed by gas and a more general view towards coal.   
When giving an outlook and describing the range of reserves and resources, this is 
done under the premise of business-as-usual (BAU) conditions.  The distinction between 
reserves and resources is as follows: 
Reserves are the quantity that can be recovered from a mineral deposit at current 
prices with current technology (under existing economic and operating conditions).   
Resources are demonstrated quantities that cannot be recovered at current prices 
with current technology (under existing economic and operating conditions) but might be 
recoverable in the future, as well as quantities that are geologically possible but not 




As explained in the preceding chapter, Germany’s oil supply comes from several 
countries.  This section concentrates on the five largest suppliers (Russia, UK, Norway, 
Libya and Syria), which represent 78% of the total German oil imports in 2002.   
 
 
                                                 
43 See BMWI, Reserves and Resources, 33; BP, 4,20. 
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1. The Russian Federation 
 
In 2001, Russia was the second-largest oil exporter behind Saudi Arabia.  Russia’s 
oil exports increased steadily since 1994.  In 2001, Russia exported 4.91 million barrels 
per day (bbl/d).  For 2002 and 2003, a further increase was projected with 5.17 and 5.4 
million bbl/d.44  The largest customers of Russian oil are Western European countries, 
led by Germany.45  In accordance to Russia’s energy strategy, “Energy Strategy of the 
Russian Federation to the Year 2020”, Russia plans to increase its oil production till 2020 
by 25% (compared to 2000), up to 405 million tons (Mt).  Its exports however, are only 
planned to increase by 8.6%, up to 208.5 Mt, as Russian consumption is expected to rise 
accordingly.46  The IEA expects a lower increase by 11.45% up to 360 Mt, however, with 
a decrease in Russia’s overall oil export of over 12% down to 165 Mt.47  The reasons for 
this assumption are an increase in domestic demands as well, the decline of older fields 
and insufficient investments in transport capacities and exploitation of newer reserves.  
While the Russian government estimates investment requirements of $8 to $10 billion per 
year till 2020 in order to meet the projected production quota, only less than $2 billion in 
1999 and under $5 billion in 2000 were achieved.48  Moreover, the statistical range of the 
Russian oil reserves under the BAU condition is limited too.  The official data about 
reserves and resources are highly unreliable, as they are perceived to be greatly 
overstated.49  The German government estimates Russian oil with 6.6% of the world’s 
reserves and a statistic range of 31 years remaining,50 while BP projects a range of only 
19.1 years and a share on the global reserves of 4.6%.51   
                                                 
44 DoE/EIA, Russia: Oil and Gas Exports (November 2002), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russexp.html  (09 June 2003). 
45 IEA, Russia Energy Survey 2002 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002), 91-92. 
46 Mastepanov, A. Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020,  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/russia/energy-strategy2020_en.pdf  (09 June 2003). 
47 IEA, 53. 
48 Ibid., 75-76. 
49 IEA, 70-71. 
50 BMWI, Energie Daten 2002, 47. 
51 British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2002  
(London: The Colourhouse, 2002), 4. 
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Although Russia will remain one of the worlds’s largest oil exporters for the next 
few years, its importance will only remain and increase if it’s assumed large resources 
can be turned into reserves.  The prerequisites, however, are either an oil price increase 
and / or technical development.   
 
2. United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) accounts for 11% of Germany’s current oil imports.   
Although the UK intends to increase its oil exports by 50% in 2005,52 its reserves are 
estimated to last at best only up to 10 years.53  BP and the EIA, however, predict the UK 
oil reserves with roughly 5 billion barrels,54 resulting in a statistical range of only 5.6 
remaining years in 2002.55  The intended increase in the oil exports corresponds with an 
intended increase in the oil production of over 18%, up to 3 million bbl/d.56  This 
discrepancy between reserves and export intentions results in the attempt by the British 
government to generate various incentives for, especially smaller, oil companies to invest 
in smaller, less efficient oil fields.57   
Whether these smaller, less efficient oil fields were formerly listed as resources 
instead of reserves cannot be ascertained.  Not is it possible to verify if German estimates 
of British capacities are more accurate.  However, the data indicate that the UK’s reserves 
are on their way to become depleted after this decade and that the oil exports will, 
therefore, decline anytime after a possible peak in 2005.   
 
                                                 
52 DoE/EIA, United Kingdom Country Analysis Brief (February 2003), 
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53 BMWI, Energie Daten 2002, 47. 
54 BP, 4;  DoE/EIA, United Kingdom Country Analysis Brief. 
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In 2001, Norway produced 3.4 million bbl/d of oil.  As its own consumption is 
considerable low, it could export more than 90% of its total production.  In 2001, Norway 
exported around 3.2 million bbl/d, which made Norway not only the world’s third-largest 
oil exporter but also Germany’s third most important supplier.58  Germany imported 
more than 1.5 million bbl/d the same year.59  Hence, its share on Norway’s oil exports 
was over 46% and remained, therefore, the most important single market.  Although BP 
and the EIA agree in the amount of Norway’s reserves, 9.44 billion barrels, they disagree 
on the statistical range.  BP predicts that only roughly 7 years remain, while the EIA 
expects the Norwegian oil to run out in the 2040s.60  The German government on the 
other hand, estimates with 14 million barrels considerable higher reserves.  Germany’s 
expectation is that Norwegian oil will last for only 11 years (2000), much closer to the 
BP prediction.61  Taking the 2001 figures, oil production of 3.4 million bbl/d and reserves 
of 9.44 billion barrels, Norway produced 1.241 billion barrels.  This would mean that, 
under BAU conditions, Norway’s reserves run out in 2008 / 2009 (7.6 years).  Unless 
new reserves are discovered anytime soon, Norway will cease to be an oil exporter at the 




Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be around 29 billion barrels.62  
Nevertheless, Libya exported only 438 million barrels (1.2 million bbl/d) in 2001.  
Around 90% of it went to Europe.  Italy is its by far largest customer (42.25%) followed 
by Germany with a 17.33% (208,000 bbl/d) share.  The low production and export rates 
are based on the former United Nations (UN) and US sanctions and the performance of 
                                                 
58 DoE/EIA, Norway Country Analysis Brief (September 2002), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/norway.html  (09 June 2003). 
59 BMWI, Energie Daten 2002, 19. 
60 DoE/EIA, Norway Country Analysis Brief;  BP, 4. 
61 BMWI, Energie Daten 2002, 47. 
62 Ibid.;  BP, 4. 
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the state run economy as well.  Nevertheless, Libya is trying to attract foreign investors 
since these sanctions are mainly lifted and is planning to increase its production capacity 
to 2 million bbl/d within 5 years.  Progress in this direction has been slow, since the 
bureaucracy and the contract awarding process are inefficient.63  With its considerable 
reserves and attractive geological conditions, Libya could attract sufficient foreign 
investment once its bureaucratic behavior improved.  Both, BP and the BMWI predict the 




In 2002, Germany imported 55.2 million barrels (7.24 Mt) oil from Syria.65  Syria 
is estimated to have produced only 525,682 bbl/d (192 million barrel) in 2002.66  This 
would mean that Syria exported over 27% of its total oil production to Germany.  
However, Syria’s reserves are predicted to be only 2.5 billion barrels.67  Hence, Syria’s 
reserves will be depleted in the middle of the next decade.  As oil production is assumed 
to steadily decline, its consumption, because of its population growth, is expected to do 
the opposite.  Syria will, therefore, become a net importer within this decade.68   
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Chapter II described that over 94.5% of Germany’s total gas imports are 
concentrated on only three countries:  Russia, Norway and The Netherlands.  This section 
examines production and exports in those three countries:   
 
1. The Russian Federation 
 
Russia is Germany’s largest gas provider with a share of 45% on its imports.  
Germany, in turn, is Russia’s largest single customer.  In 2000, 18.5% of Russia’s gas 
exports went to Germany, and in 2001, 17.2%.  With 6.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), Russia 
is already the world’s largest gas exporters, Russia is expected to increase its export to 
7.5 Tcf in 2005.69  All Russian gas exports so far have gone to Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and no changes are expected at least until 
2010.  Europe, including Turkey and the Baltic states, is Russia’s main destination for its 
gas exports.  Over 60% of Russia’s exports went to Europe in 2000 and 2001.70  The 
Russian government expects the gas production as well as the export to increase around 
20% until 2020, to 700 billion cubic meters (Bcm) and 234 Bcm respectively.71  Russia 
owns reserves of around 47-48 Tcm, which gives it a share of roughly 30% on the 
world’s total reserves and makes it by far the largest “gas nation”.  These reserves 
provide for a statistical range of at least a further 80 years.72  Hence, the increase in 
production and exports should be manageable.  However, the gas sector suffers the same 
imponderables as the oil sector.  These are, besides the monopoly of Gazprom, the 
insufficient investments.  An average of more than $8 billion per year is required until 
2020 in order to meet the intended figures.  As Gazprom is still responsible for over 90% 
of Russia’s total gas production, its share in investments is required to be in the same 
dimension.  In 1999 and 2000, Gazprom’s investments are estimated to be only $3.1 to 
                                                 
69 DoE/EIA, Russia: Oil and Gas Exports. 
70 Ibid.; IEA, 134-137. 
71 Mastepanov. 
72 BMWI, ENERGIE DATEN 2002, 48;  IEA, 111;  BP, 20. 
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$3.6 billion.73  Moreover, Gazprom cut its investments for field exploration to $453 




Behind Russia, Norway is Europe’s second-largest gas exporter.  The gas export 
in 2002 is assumed to be between 1.9 and 2.3 Tcf.75  In 2001, Germany imported around 
0.77 Tcf and for 2002 a slight increase is forecast.76  This would result in a German share 
on Norwegian gas exports of between 35% and 40%.  Norway’s gas reserves are 
predicted to be a total of 44 Tcf.77  Although Norwegian domestic consumption is 
expected to increase over the next years, it does so on a relative low level as the current 
consumption is limited.78  Hence, the overwhelming amount of Norwegian reserves is 
available for export.  The reserves are predicted to last at least 22 years,79 while the 
BMWI assumes a statistical range of over 50 years, because it expects far larger reserves 
than BP and EIA.80   
                                                 
73 IEA, 120. 
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3. The Netherlands 
 
In 2000, the Netherlands produced 2.6 Tcf natural gas and exported 866 Bcf of 
it.81  Approximately 590 Bcf were exported to Germany, a quota of 68%.82  Germany is, 
therefore, by far the Netherlands’ most important customer.  Although the Dutch 
government decided to limit gas production, in order to keep reserves for the future, the 
overall situation is not expected to change.83  Both the BMWI and BP expect Dutch 
reserves to last a further 25 years.84  Hence, the Netherlands can remain an important gas 




The forecasts for coal (hard and lignite) differ, depending to which extent known 
deposits are considered reserves or resources.  An additional obstacle is that the 
publications define regions differently, e.g. combining Africa and Middle East or 
distinguishing between the Asia-Pacific region and landlocked Asia.  Nevertheless, the 
predictions for how long the coal will last are similar and the results are equally 
conclusive.  The world coal reserves are expected to last at least over 160 years,85 while 
most forecasts are predicting more than 210 years,86 with the least reserves in the Asian 
Far East and Europe.  However, the predictions for these regions are still at least 100 
years.87  As most world regions have reserves for at least 160 years and these are much 
diversified, there will be no constraints for Germany on future access and imports of coal.  
Hence, coal is of much lesser concern than oil and gas.   
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As discussed in chapter I, the German oil and gas demand will not decline until 
2020.  Hence, the oil supply situation for Germany becomes complex already in this 
decade.  Since oil imports from the UK and Syria are expected to cease after 2005, 18% 
of the current oil supply has to be substituted within this decade.  Russia might not be 
available to provide the amount necessary as its current investments are far below the 
requirements needed to meet the goals of the Russian energy strategy.  The gas situation 
is somewhat less urgent as a supply shift has to take place only after 2010, when the 
Norwegian and Dutch gas reserves will cease to satisfy the export demand.  However, 
some critical thinking on Germany’s gas supply after 2010 is presently necessary.  
Therefore, the next chapter discusses alternative supply regions after 2010.   
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IV. ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY REGIONS 
A. GLOBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AFTER 2010 
 
In order to evaluate the possibility of alternative energy supplies for Germany, we 
must first take a look at the overall global energy development.  The first issue to be 
addressed is that of economic and population forecasts, as these two factors are the 
primary determinants of energy demand.88  This will be followed by the a discusion of 
the world’s distribution of oil and gas reserves / resources.  The third step will then be the 
examination of possible energy suppliers after 2010.  As described in the previous 
chapter, coal consumption will remain steady and the supply uncritical.  Therefore, coal 
will not be viewed in this chapter.   
 
1. World Population and Economic Development 
 
The global population continues to experience growth, although the rate of 
increase is slowing down.89  Most remarkably, however, is the drastic shift away from the 
industrialized countries to the developing countries.  The result is an increasing share for 
the developing countries on the world’s population (Figure 4.1).  Together with an 
increasing GDP, this will lead to higher industrialization, urbanization and transportation, 
hence, stimulating the increase of energy consumption as well.  Already in 2010, the 
developing countries will share slightly 40% of the global energy demand.  Moreover, 




                                                 
88 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Energy: The Next Fifty Years 
(Paris: OECD, 1999), 32-33. 
89 European Commission (EC), World Energy, Technology and Climate Policy Outlook (WETO) 2030 
(Brussels: Directorate-General for Research, 2003), 14. 
90 Martin, W., Imai, R., Steeg, H., Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context (New York, Paris, 
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Figure 4.1: World Population by Region (- 2030) 
 
(From: European Commission (EC), World Energy, Technology and Climate Policy Outlook 
(WETO) 2030 (Brussels: Directorate-General for Research, 2003), 16.) 
 
The world economy is expected to grow by approximately 3% per year for the 
next 25 to 30 years.91  Like the population growth, the shares of the world GDP for the 
developing countries will also increase from roughly 19% in 2001 to roughly 27% in 
2025, once again driven primarily by China and other East Asian countries (Figure 4.2).92   
 
 
                                                 
91 EC, 15;  DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 8. 
92 DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 8. 
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(From: EC, 18.) 
 
The combined effects of persisting population and economic growth will 
consequently lead to a further spike in world energy consumption (Figure 4.3).  Most 
forecasts anticipate a significant growth in the world energy consumption, while the 
importance of oil, gas and coal for the global energy consumption is even expected to 
increase; up to 88% compared to 81% in 2001.93  The EIA predicts an increase in the 
global energy consumption of 58.5% from 2001 to 2025.94  The European Commission 
(EC) forecasts a similar increase of 70% between 2000 and 2030.95  The German 
Mineralölwirtschaftsverband, an association of the oil sector related companies, predicts 
a similar development with an increase of fossil fuels of 65% by 2020, compared to that 
of 1995.  In this forecast, fossil fuels will primarily be responsible for 95% of the 
consumption growth.96   
 
                                                 
93 EC, 24. 
94 DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 7. 
95 EC, 24. 
96 Mineralöwirtschaftsverband (MWV), MineralölForum: Energiemarkt im Wandel, 8. 
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Figure 4.3: World Energy Consumption (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC, 24.) 
 
It is expected that the energy intensity and the ratio of energy consumption to the 
GDP will decrease (therefore improve) worldwide over the two decades.  This will occur 
more efficiently in the industrialized countries than in the developing countries.  
Although the improvement rate of the developing countries is higher, compared to the 
industrialized countries, the required energy per GDP achievement will remain higher for 
the foreseeable future in the developing countries.97  Nevertheless, the per capita 
consumption of energy will remain higher in the industrialized countries, at least until 
2030 (Figure 4.4). Henceforth, the overall energy demand will remain high.   
 
 
                                                 
97 OECD, 51-52. 
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Figure 4.4: Energy Consumption per Capita (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC; 30.) 
 
Having described the global energy development, the next section will address the 
world distribution of both oil and gas reserves / resources. 
 
2. Distribution of Oil and Gas 
 
As illustrated in the previous section, oil remains the largest energy source in the 
mid-term perspective.  The EIA expects oil to hold a steady share of 38% in 2025 
compared to 39% in 2001.98  However, OPEC99 will increase its importance over the 
upcoming decades, as the production closes the gap to the respective reserves and 
resources of non-OPEC states (Figure 4.5).  The EC predicts a decline in the oil resources 
by 84% in non-OPEC states and by 19% within the OPEC.  The OPEC will be 
responsible for 60% of total oil supply in 2030, of which 46% will be provided by the 
Middle East member states (Figure 4.6).  Moreover, as of 2030, OPEC will hold 95% of 
the global oil reserves, compared to the current 80%.  An additional advantage for the 
                                                 
98 DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2. 
99 Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, UAE, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela. 
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Middle East OPEC member states is that the oil reservoirs in the Gulf region are fairly 
easy to exploit, contrary to most of the remaining global reservoirs.100   
 
 Figure 4.5: OPEC and non-OPEC Conventional Oil Resources (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC, 41.) 
 
Figure 4.6: World Oil Production (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC, 42.) 
 
 
                                                 
100 EC, 40-41. 
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Figure 4.7 highlights the current distribution of oil reserves, which are already 
concentrated in the Middle East.101   
 
Figure 4.7: Distribution of Proved Oil Reserves 2001 
 
(From: British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2002 (London: The 
Colourhouse, 2002), 5.) 
 
                                                 
101 BP, 4. 
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Unlike oil, gas reserves are not expected to deplete anytime soon.  According to 
BP statistics, the worldwide statistical range of gas will ensure supply for more than 60 
years.102  The share on the total primary energy consumption will grow from the current 
23% to 28% in 2025, becoming the second largest source for the overall energy 
consumption.  This effect will be triggered primarily by the increasing gas-based 
electricity production, which reflects the growing electricity demand.103  The gap 
between production and resources of the main contributors, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and the Gulf region, will not close significantly until at least 
2030 (Figure 4.8).104  In 2001, the CIS and the Middle East region accounted for more 
than 72% of the global gas reserves (Figure 4.9).105  Moreover, the EC forecasts a growth 
in reserves by 14% until 2030 for these two regions, increasing their share of the global 
gas reserves further.106   
 
Figure 4.8: Gas Resources in the CIS and the Gulf (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC, 43.) 
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of Proved Gas Reserves 2001 
 
(From: BP, 21.) 
 
Consequently, while there will be only a slight increase of gas production in the 
OECD countries, the increase for the CIS and Middle East region will be far more 
significant.  The CIS suppliers will be able to increase their gas production from 28% in 
2000 to more than 40% in 2030.  The CIS, together with Middle East countries, will be 








                                                 
107 Ibid.43. 
 35
Figure 4.10: World Gas Production (- 2030) 
 
(From: EC, 44.) 
 
3. Alternative Suppliers after 2010 
 
The previous section highlighted the fact that besides the Gulf region, only few 
potential oil suppliers will remain during the coming decades.  Russia will not be 
discussed in this section, as the country was already discussed in Chapter III.  The first 
potential oil alternatives to be viewed are those outside the Middle East, namely Latin 
America and Caribbean Sea region, North America, Africa, Asia Pacific and the Caspian 
Sea region (excluding Russia).  This section will conclude with a more general 
description of the Middle East.   
 
a. Latin America and Caribbean Sea Basin 
 
Latin America is defined in this thesis as the Central American states, 
excluding Mexico, and the South American states.  The Caribbean Sea basin will include 
all Caribbean islands, including the Bahamas.   
By far, the largest oil and gas reserves in this region are owned by 
Venezuela.  In 2003, the Venezuelan oil reserves accounted for more than 7.5% (77.8 
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billion barrels) of the world’s proven reserves, which are the largest outside the Middle 
East.  In 2002, Venezuela produced 2.9 million bbl/d, of which more than 84% were 
exported.  Only a small share (160,000 bbl/d) was exported to Central American and 
Caribbean states, the vast majority was destined for the USA (1.4 million bbl/d).  
Additionally, some of the oil exports to the Netherland Antilles and U.S. Virgin Islands 
are refined there and then re-exported to the US.108  With a predicted statistical range of 
more than 67 years109 and its export capacities, even if the domestic consumption will 
rise, Venezuela will remain a major oil supplier for the next decades, particularly for the 
US.  With proven gas reserves of 148 Tcf, as of 2003, these are the second largest on the 
American continent behind the US.  The current production rate is very low.  In 2001, 
Venezuela produced only 1.1 Tcf, all for domestic consumption.110  Although Venezuela 
has the potential to become a larger gas exporter, huge investments are required to 
expand the existing small gas producing industry.   
 
The second largest proven oil reserves, with 8.5 billion barrels, are located 
in Brazil.  However, Brazil produced only 1.6 million bbl/d in 2001, but consumed 2.2 
million bbl/d.  Hence, more than one-fourth of the domestic consumption had to be 
imported.  Although the oil production is expected to grow, the domestic consumption is 
also expected to grow in the coming years.111  As the statistical range of Brazil’s oil is 
only forecast with 17.5 years,112 Brazil will foreseeable never become a net exporter.  
The current proven gas reserves are only 7.8 Tcf and the current production rate is not 
sufficient enough to meet the domestic demand.  The domestic consumption is expected 
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to increase further.  However, as recent explorations have concentrated on oil, there 
might be the possibility of additional gas fields.113   
Argentina has the third-largest proven oil reserves in Latin America, with 
3.0 billion barrels.114  Currently, Argentina is exporting slightly more than 300 million 
bbl/d to its South American neighbors.115  However, as the reserves will last only until 
the beginning of the next decade,116 Argentina will not play an important role in the oil 
market.  More potential exists within Argentine gas supply.  Argentina possesses the 
second largest proven gas reserves in Latin America, with 27.5 Tcf.117  Moreover, it is 
expected that its resources are significantly higher.  Since 1999, Argentina, already Latin 
America’s largest gas producer, has production capacities that are currently exceeding 
domestic consumption as well as export.118  Hence, Argentina’s importance as a natural 
gas supplier will at least increase regionally.   
With estimated gas reserves between 24 Tcf and probably more than 52 
Tcf, Bolivia has the potential to become an important gas supplier too, although much 
development and investments are still required.119  According to these numbers, Bolivia 
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b. North America 
 
  The term North America includes, besides Canada and the US, the third 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) member --Mexico.   
 The predictions for Canada’s proven oil reserves vary between 4.9 billion 
barrels120 and 6.6 billion barrels;121 nevertheless, with a production rate of 2.9 million 
bbl/d122, the Canadian reserves will become depleted by 2010.  Consequently, although 
Canada is still the third-largest crude oil supplier for the US, behind Saudi-Arabia and 
Mexico, the importance of Canadian oil for the US will diminish drastically within this 
decade.  The situation of Canada’s gas is similar to that of the oil sector.  Canada is 
currently the second-largest natural gas exporter after Russia and accounts for reserves of 
59.7 Tcf. However, with the current production rate of 6.5 Tcf, its reserves will be 
depleted soon after 2010.  There is hope that further reserves will be discovered in the far 
northwest sector of Canada and that the situation will change accordingly.123   
 In autumn 2002, Mexico revised its oil and gas reserve calculations in 
order to meet the common international standards, especially for that of the US Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The result was a dramatic decrease in both types of 
reserves.  The proven oil reserves were now merely 12.6 billion barrels instead of 26.9 
billion barrels and the proven gas reserves were revised from 29.5 to 8.8 Tcf.  The oil 
reserves will, therefore, become depleted soon after 2010 and the gas reserves between 
2008 and 2010.  Hence, although Mexico is currently the second-largest oil supplier for 
the US, this will change rapidly especially as the domestic energy consumption is on a 
steady rise.  Also in the case of Mexico some hope might exist, as there are expectations 
for considerable oil and gas resources.124   
                                                 
120 DoE/EIA, Canada Country Analysis Brief (December 2002), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/canada.html  (09 June 2003). 
121 BP, 4. 
122 DoE/EIA, Canada Country Analysis Brief. 
123 Ibid. 
124 DoE/EIA, Mexico Country Analysis Brief (February 2003), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/mexico.pdf  (09 June 2003). 
 39
 The United States and its world largest energy demand are dominating 
(not only) the North American energy market.  The EIA, in its reference case, forecasts a 
steady growth of energy consumption for the US.  Between 2001 and 2020, the average 
annual increase is predicted at 1.5%, with an overall total of 30%.125  The oil production 
rate, however, is expected to grow only 0.22% per year until 2025 (approx. 29 million 
bbl/d).126  Gas production is likewise expected not to hold up with growing domestic 
demand during the same timeframe.127  Hence, oil and gas has to be imported to a larger 
extent to meet the growing US demand.  In its reference case, the EIA predicts an 
increase of oil imports between 2001 and 2025 by at least 63.3%.128  The imports of 
natural gas will also rise, by approximately two-third in the same timeframe, from 




 The most important energy producers of the African continent are Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya and Nigeria.  As Libya was already discussed in the previous chapter, it is 
not included in the examination for this section.   
Although Algeria possesses the largest proven gas reserves and third-
largest proven oil reserves of the African states, even larger resources are expected in 
both cases as there were relatively few exploration operations in the last few years.  The 
current proven oil reserves are at 9.2 billion barrels or 1.2 billion tons.130  The German 
Ministry of Economy (BMWI) estimates the proven reserves with 1.8 billion tons (13.8 
billion barrels).131  Over 80% of Algeria’s oil production is exported, primarily to 
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Europe, but also to the US.  Even if Algeria increases its domestic consumption, it 
intends to increase its production capacities as well, from the current 1.1 million bbl/d to 
2 million bbl/d in 2012 and will therefore remain a net exporter.132  Nevertheless, the 
strategic range will be at least 2 decades.133  As mentioned earlier, Algeria is predicted to 
have the largest African proven gas reserves, 160 Tcf, which is 2.9% of the world proven 
reserves as well.134  The Algerian state owned oil and gas monopoly, Sonatrach, expects 
the existence of additional 44 Tcf in gas reserves.  The gas production is also primarily 
exported, nearly exclusively to Europe where Algeria already accounts for 20% of all 
European Union (EU) gas imports.135  The proven reserves alone guarantee a strategic 
range of more than 50 years in gas production.136   
Although the Egyptian oil production still meets the domestic demand,137 
it is already declining and it is predicted that its proven oil reserves will not exceed 
2015.138  The situation for the natural gas sector is much more positive.  In October 2002, 
the Egyptian Government revised the amount of proven gas reserves from 35.2 Tcf to 
58.5 Tcf, while anticipating an additional 62.5 Tcf as probable reserves.  Consequently, 
Egypt intends to increase its gas exports, predominantly that of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), 5 Bcf/d by 2007.139  The natural gas statistical range will therefore increase to at 
least more than 40 years or possibly over 60 years, taking the new figures into 
consideration.   
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While the BMWI prediction of Nigeria’s proven oil reserves is of 22.5 
billion barrels,140 the OPEC prediction is at 31.5 billion barrels.141  In that the oil 
production rate in 2002 was approximately 0.767 billion barrels, the statistical range of 
the Nigerian reserves vary therefore from less than 30 years to over 40 years. If the 
Nigerian government is correctly expecting more than 40 billion barrels of proven 
reserve, this would increase the statistical range accordingly.142  The proven gas reserves 
are commonly predicted at 124 Tcf, the second largest in Africa and the ninth-largest 
worldwide.143  Due to the lack of an appropriate gas industry and infrastructure, Nigeria 
is using only slightly more than 10% for direct energy consumption.  The remainder 
(75%) is either flared or re-injected into oil reservoirs.144  Hence, the potential exists for 
Nigeria to become an important global gas supplier.   
 
d. Asia Pacific Region 
 
 The only net oil exporters in the Asia Pacific Region are Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  Both, however, will become net oil importers around 2010.  The current 
proven oil reserves in Indonesia are at 5 billion barrels.145  Unfortunately, these reserves 
are already mature and with an average production rate of nearly 1.2 million bbl/d, the 
Indonesian oil fields will become depleted by 2010, and Indonesia will turn into a net oil 
importer within this decade.146  The situation for Malaysia is similar.  Malaysia’s proven 
reserves of 3 billion barrels will be depleted around 2010.147  The average oil production 
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rate of the previous years ranged between 650,000 bbl/d and 730,000 bbl/d; hence, 
Malaysia will become a net importer close to 2010.148   
The perceptions of the gas sector, on the contrary, are much better.  
Malaysia’s proven gas reserves are at 75 Tcf.149  The overall gas production in 2000 was 
1.5 Tcf, of which 0.74 Tcf were LNG exports (ca. 15% of total world LNG exports) 
predominately to the leading Asian industrialized countries.  Additional LNG facilities 
are already under construction, thus, Malaysia will be able to increase its exports of LNG 
further.150  Nevertheless, the statistical range will be at least 50 years.151   
Indonesia, with 92.5 Tcf, has the region’s largest proven gas reserves.152  
Additionally, it is expected that Indonesia’s gas resources are considerable, yet it lacks 
any concrete figures.  Already, by far the world’s largest LNG exporter, Indonesia 
intends to double its LNG export capacities in the upcoming years.153  The statistical 
range, however, will remain for approximately 50 years.154   
The second-largest proven gas reserves, 90 Tcf, in the Asian Pacific 
Region are located within the Australian territory.155  However, Australia produced only 
1.12 Tcf in 2001, of which a small amount--that of 365,000 Bcf were exported.  The 
development of the Australian gas industry is only at the beginning; however, it will 
advance in the future with great export potential also in the LNG sector.156   
 China is already the world third-largest oil consumer, following the US 
and Japan.  As the economic activities steadily increase, the oil consumption is expected 
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to grow as well.  The consumption forecast for 2020 is 10.5 million bbl/d, which would 
make China the second-largest oil consumer at that time.  Despite that China has large 
gas reserves, 48.3 Tcf,157 of its own it does not produce enough to match domestic 
demand, although gas accounts for only 3% of China’s energy consumption.  Hence, 
already a gas importer, China’s gas demand will increase further as energy consumption 
is expected to at least triple until 2010.158   
 
e. Caspian Sea Region 
 
 The only countries to be discussed under this topic are Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as Russia was already discussed in Chapter II separately.  
Iran will be viewed as part of the Middle East.  However, due to its proximity, historic 
and contemporary ties, (i.e. FSU and CIS), Uzbekistan is viewed as part of the Caspian 
Sea region as well.   
Azerbaijan’s proven oil reserves are accounted for 0.7% of the world’s 
reserves, which are at least 7.0 billion barrels.159  In 2001, Azerbaijan produced only 
311,000 bbl/d compared to an estimated 500,000 bbl/d during the Soviet era.  
Nevertheless, as the production has grown steadily over the previous years and foreign 
investment continues to flow into the country, further production growth can be expected.  
This is the case also for Azerbaijan’s oil export.  In 2001, Azerbaijan exported 175,200 
bbl/d, or over 56% of its total production.  With the constant flow of investments and the 
ongoing  pipeline projects to Turkey via Georgia an increasing oil export is predicted.160  
Azerbaijan shares a similar part on the world gas reserves in oil.  The proven gas reserves 
estimate is about 30 Tcf.161  The gas production, however, is not in accordance with the 
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respective potential, because of the non-existing gas industrial infrastructure.  In 2000, 
Azerbaijan produced only 200 Bcf.  Moreover, in 2001, Azerbaijan had to import 125 
Bcf from Russia.  Although the build up / refurbishing of the Azerbaijani gas industry 
will take time, based on the current investment activities also in the gas sector, 
Azerbaijan is expected to become a net gas exporter shortly after 2010.162   
 The country with the most potential, in terms of oil and gas supply, is 
Kazakhstan.  The German BMWI predicts Kazakhstan’s proven oil reserves at more than 
21 billion barrels, which is 1.9% of the world’s proven reserves.163  With the help of 
massive foreign investments, Kazakhstan was able to increase its production to 811,000 
bbl/d in 2001, after its massive decline following the demise of the Soviet Union.  The 
production rates for 2010 and 2015 are expected to be 2 million bbl/d by 2010 and 2.5 
million bbl/d by 2015.  In 2001, Kazakhstan exported 631,000 bbl/d solely through 
Russian pipelines, as it is the sole means of a connection for Kazakhstan to the world 
market.  Several pipeline projects with Russia and via the Caucasus to Turkey will enable 
Kazakhstan to increase its exports further so that it will grow to as a significant player on 
the oil market.164  Kazakhstan’s proven gas reserves are remarkable too.  Approximately 
65 Tcf are expected to exist on its territory.165  However, because of a limited gas 
infrastructure, Kazakhstan is indeed a gas importer.  In order to become independent of 
Uzbekistan’s gas imports and to benefit from its reserves, the Kazakh government intends 
to increase its gas production to 1.84 Tcf in 2015.  This would enable Kazakhstan to 
export 1.2 Tcf in the same year, as the domestic consumption is expected to remain 
stable.166   
 The outlook on Turkmenistan’s oil sector is somewhat vague, in that the 
reserve predictions vary.  While BP predicts only 0.5 billion barrels for Turkmenistan,167 
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the US EIA expects possible reserves of up to 1.7 billion barrels.168  Although that 
Turkmenistan is already a net oil exporter, approximately 3.9 million barrels in 2001, it 
will take several years until Turkmenistan will be able to come up to its possible 
potential.  The reason being the unfavorable investment climate in the energy sector, 
which is heavily regulated by the government and hinders foreign oil producers to access 
export pipelines.  Additionally, the energy prices are set by the state and are well below 
international market price.  The same constraints exist for the gas sector with the 
additional disadvantage that Turkmenistan has its only access to the global market 
through Russia (via Kazakhstan) and, to a lesser extent, Iran.  However, with 101 Tcf 
proven gas reserves, Turkmenistan owns the ninth-largest world reserves.169  Since 1998, 
Turkmenistan was able to increase its gas production in large steps, from 0.47 Tcf to 1.64 
Tcf in 2000.  The export exploded likewise, as the domestic consumption grew only 
slightly from 0.16 Tcf to 0.26 Tcf during the same timeframe.  Hence, Turkmenistan 
exported already 1.38 Tcf in 2000 and a further increase in production and export can be 
expected, despite the constraints mentioned earlier.170   
 Although Uzbekistan is still a small oil exporter, approximately 30,000 
bbl/d in 2000, this will change soon, as the production will decline to 120,000 bbl/d until 
2005.171  The reasons are the depleting reserves, which will only be available until the 
beginning of the next decade.172  The situation of the gas sector is slightly better.  The 
predicted proven gas reserves are of 66.2 Tcf.173  The EIA expected a production rate of 
2.03 Tcf in 2001, while consuming slightly more than 1.51 Tcf as in 2000.  As 
Uzbekistan exported 0.48 Tcf in 2000, the export in 2001 is expected to increase also.174  
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The statistical range by this production rate would be 32.6 years (2001), however, the 
question is how the Uzbek energy market is developing while the oil production is 
declining.  If the domestic demand will be served increasingly by gas, not only the small 
export quote will rapidly decline, but also the statistical range of the domestic gas 
reserves.   
 
f. Middle East 
 
This section includes the countries in the Persian Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula, as well as Syria and Yemen.  Countries of the Middle East are generally 
blessed with tremendous reserves, mostly ranging for several decades often for more than 
one hundred years.   
 The total proven oil reserves of the Middle East are predicted with more 
than 685 billion barrels.  These are over 65% of all global oil reserves and provide for a 
statistical range of at least 86 years.  By far the largest oil reserves, 261.8 billion barrels, 
are owned by Saudi Arabia, which owns 36% of world reserves.  The next largest group 
is built of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE), making up reserves for 
8.5% (98.7 billion barrels) to 10.7% (112.5 billion barrels) of the total global reserves.  
All together, these five states provide 62.6% of all proven reserves.175   
 The amount of proven gas reserves is not as large as the oil reserves.  
However, with more than two-third (36.1%) of the global proven reserves, this region is 
as important as the FSU (36.2%) countries.  Nevertheless, the overall statistical range is 
far beyond 100 years.  Iran has, by far, the largest gas reserves (812.3 Tcf, 14.8% of 
world reserves) for this region and the second-largest worldwide.176   
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The global energy consumption will grow by nearly 60% by 2025, while the 
significance of fossil fuels will increase as well.  Despite the efforts to improve energy 
efficiency and renewable energy production, the share of fossil fuels will increase from 
81% to 88% by 2025.  The importance of oil and gas will, therefore, increase further.  On 
the other hand, oil and gas reserves will become depleted in several countries already 
within the next decade.   
The huge US demand will absorb the supply from among the American continent, 
as most probably, Canadian and Mexican imports will have to be substituted within one 
decade, provided they will not be able to recover additional reserves and / or turn 
resources into reserves.  The importance of the entire American continent, in terms of 
energy supply, will therefore be only regional.   
The African continent is also limited to a regional provider either.  Northern 
African gas supply will be absorbed by Europe, while Nigerian oil and gas will be 
provided world wide, although with limited shares.   
After 2010, the Asia Pacific region will have remarkable gas reserves left to 
distribute.  However, like today the ever-growing Chinese demand will absorb these 
supplies as will Japan and Korea. Hence, also the Asia Pacific will be of only regional 
importance.   
The only regions left that will be capable of providing oil and gas on a global 
level to meet the growing world demand will be the Middle East, Russia and other 
Caspian Sea neighbors.  In terms of oil it will be the Middle East and Caspian Sea (see 
Figure 4.7), and in terms of gas it will be predominantly Russia, along with the Middle 
East (see Figure 4.9).   
These developments are already reflected by the current trade routes (Figures 4.11 






Figure 4.11: Major Current Oil Trade Movements 
 
(From: BP, 19) 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Major Current Gas Trade Movements 
 


















In the previous chapters, it was argued that the energy supply on the international 
energy market will significantly shift within one decade.  In summary, one fact is clear:  
Germany’s energy import dependence will undoubtedly increase in the future.  Even in 
the most optimistic case, energy consumption will decrease thorough 2020 by 3%, 
nuclear energy will have to be substituted by fossil fuels, upon which import Germany is 
already highly dependent.  The import dependence in the mid-term can be expected to 
increase to at least three-fourth of the future total primary energy consumption.  On the 
other hand, the oil and gas supply situation for Germany will become more complex in 
the next decade.  Since oil imports from the UK and Syria are expected to cease after 
2005, 18% of the current oil supply will have to be substituted within this decade.  
Russia, however, may not be available to provide the amount necessary, as its current 
investments are already far below the requirements needed to meet the goals of the 
Russian energy strategy.  The gas situation is somewhat less urgent, as a supply shift will 
have to take place only after 2010, when the Norwegian and Dutch gas reserves cease to 
satisfy the export demand.  The only regions left that will be able to provide oil and gas 
on a global level to meet the growing world demand will be the Middle East, Russia and 
other Caspian Sea neighbors.  In terms of oil, it will be the Middle East and Caspian Sea, 
and in terms of gas, it will be the Middle East and Russia.   
The huge US demand will absorb the supply from the American continents, as 
most likely, Canadian and Mexican supply will have to be substituted within one decade, 
provided they will not be able to recover additional reserves and / or turn resources into 
reserves.  The significance of the entire American continent in terms of energy supply 
will, therefore, be only regional.  The African continent will also be limited to a regional 
provider.  Northern African gas supply will be absorbed by Europe, while Nigerian oil 
and gas will be provided worldwide, although with limited shares.  After 2010, the Asian 
Pacific region will be only possessing remarkable gas reserves left to distribute.  
However, like today, the ever-growing Chinese demand, plus Japan and South Korea will 
absorb these supplies. Hence, the Asian Pacific will also be of only regional importance.   
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The consequences for the German foreign energy policy are manifold.  As there is 
nearly no possibility to avoid the future concentration of oil and gas supplier, Germany, 
in cooperation with the EU, at a minimum will have to diversify the supply routes and 
distribution companies as far as possible.  The outlet for the Caspian Sea and Central 
Asian fuels is still primarily available via means of Russia.  The INOGATE programs of 
the EU, financing and supporting pipeline projects in Azerbaijan and Georgia connecting 
the Caspian Sea / Central Asia region with Europe, are steps in the right direction and 
should be continued.  Similar projects should be sought as well to connect the 
underdeveloped energy sectors of North African states with Europe.   
Most of the national energy sectors are still state owned or directed.  The German 
government will have, therefore, to support the private German oil and gas companies to 
acquire future desired contracts.  These will not only support contracts in terms of long-
running delivery agreements, but also those of the internationally standard small German 
oil and gas producing companies, such as Wintershall (active in Russia and Algeria) and 
GWDF (Georgia and Kazakhstan).   
Although the OPEC monopoly will become even more important in the future, 
provided it survives the current struggles, Germany and the EU should try to limit the 
possible price gauging effects with politically and economically attractive contracts / 
agreements on bi-national levels.  These could be in terms of favorable accession to 
special EU markets and particular support / development measures.  One issue, which 
should, however, be high on the German government’s agenda, is to prevent the creation 
of a gas monopoly similar to OPEC with political means.  With the founding of the Gas 
Exporting Countries’ Forum (GECF), Algeria and Russia have especially tried to build 
such kind of an organization.   
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Germany’s welfare is directly dependent on its economical success.  As a highly 
industrialized country, Germany should take a tremendous interest not only in the future 
development of the international energy market, but also in attempting to influence the 
development immediately following that of its domestic needs.  A common EU energy 
strategy, as is currently under discussion with the EU “Green Paper”, proposes a 
significant and promising way.  However, in order to influence this discussion, Germany 
should create a national foreign energy strategy, in opposition to that of a purely domestic 
energy policy.  Moreover, until the EU achieves a common strategy, a national foreign 
energy strategy will be essential to ensure further economic development and welfare in 
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